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I. INTRODUCTION
James Huberty drove to a McDonald’s restaurant “after announc-
ing casually to his wife, ‘I’m going to hunt humans.’”  Stepping 
into the restaurant with a 9-millimeter Browning automatic pistol 
in his belt and a 12-gauge shotgun and a 9-millimeter UZI semiau-
tomatic rifle slung over his shoulders, Huberty called out, “‘Eve-
rybody on the floor.’  About 45 patrons were present.  As they 
scrambled to comply, Huberty marched around the restaurant 
calmly spraying gunfire . . . . 
Maria Diaz ran out the side door in panic when the shooting start-
ed, then remembered that her two-year-old son was still inside.  
She crept back to a window and saw him sitting obediently in a 
booth.  She motioned him toward the door, nudged it open, and the 
boy toddled to safety.” 
Not everyone was so fortunate. 
After SWAT sharpshooters finally killed Huberty, “police and 
hospital workers moved in on the gruesome scene.  A mother and 
father lay sprawled across their baby, apparently in an attempt to 
shield it.  All three were dead.” 
The carnage was clearly far worse than it would have been had 
Huberty not been armed with semiautomatic weapons.  He fired 
hundreds of rounds.  “The gunfire was so heavy that police at first 
assumed that more than one gunman was inside.  A fire truck took 
six shots before reversing direction and backing off.  One fire 
fighter was grazed by a bullet that tore through the truck and then 
landed softly on his head.” 
∗. Brian Roth is a student at The John Marshall Law School, where he serves as editor-
in-chief of The John Marshall Law Review.  He will graduate in May 2013.  He wishes to 
thank his family for their love and support. 
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In all, of the 45 patrons in the restaurant, Huberty killed 21 and 
wounded 15 others.1
Unfortunately, this is just one of many instances where the use of as-
sault weapons has resulted in catastrophic tragedy.2  The shootings in Auro-
ra, Colorado,3 Oak Creek, Wisconsin,4 and Portland, Oregon5 are some of the 
most recent incidents involving assault weapons. 
On July 20, 2012, a gunman—James Eagan Holmes—entered a movie 
theater in Aurora, Colorado and opened fire.6  He first launched gas grenades 
and then began calmly and methodically shooting.7  One of the individuals 
present described the scene:  “‘He was sitting there like target practice.  He 
was trying to shoot as many people as he could.’”8  As another person ob-
served:  “‘There was gunfire, there were babies, there were kids, there was 
blood everywhere.’”9  The gunman killed twelve and wounded fifty-eight.10
Authorities speculated that the carnage would have been worse, but for the 
fact that the gunman’s assault weapon jammed.11
On August 5, 2012, Wade Michael Page killed six and wounded four at 
a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.12  Page was allegedly motivated by a 
 1. Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 587 (Cal. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 2. See, e.g., Assault Weapons Policy Summary, L. CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE
(May 21, 2012), http://smartgunlaws.org/assault-weapons-policy-summary/.  Assault weapons 
have been the weapon of choice in many high-profile incidents, including the “1993 office 
shooting[s] at . . . 101 California Street . . . in San Francisco, [California],” the “1999 Colum-
bine High School massacre in [Columbine,] Colorado,” and the 2007 Westroads Mall shoot-
ing in Omaha, Nebraska.  Id.
 3. Jennifer Brown, Midnight Massacre:  Aurora Theater Shooting “Our Hearts are 
Broken,” DENVER POST, July 21, 2012, at A1. 
 4. Police Identify Army Veteran as Wisconsin Temple Shooting Gunman, CNN U.S. 
(Aug. 7, 2012, 7:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/06/us/wisconsin-temple-
shooting/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. 
 5. John Bacon, Oregon Mall Shooter, Victims Identified, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2012, 
6:51 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/11/oregon-mall-
shooting/1762473/. 
 6. See Brown, supra note 3. 
 7. Id.
 8. Id.
 9. Ed Pilkington & Matt Williams, Colorado Theater Shooting:  12 Shot Dead During 
The Dark Knight Rises Screening, THEGUARDIAN (July 20, 2012, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/20/colorado-theater-shooting-dark-knight. 
 10. Brown, supra note 3. 
 11. David A. Fahrenthold et al., A Day of Tears and Twists in Colorado, WASH. POST,
July 23, 2012, at A1. 
 12. Police Identify Army Veteran as Wisconsin Temple Shooting Gunman, supra note 4; 
see also Todd Richmond, Wade Michael Page, Sikh Temple Shooter, Acted Alone, FBI Says,
HUFF POST (Nov. 20, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/wade-
3
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fervent commitment to white supremacy causes.13  The deceased victims 
ranged in age from thirty-nine to eighty-four years old.14  Page was armed 
with a lawfully-purchased “Springfield Armory XDM 9-[millimeter] semiau-
tomatic pistol.”15
On December 11, 2012, Jacob Tyler Roberts entered a mall near Port-
land, Oregon with an AR-15 semiautomatic assault rifle.16  On a busy holi-
day shopping day, Roberts killed two people and seriously injured a third 
person before turning the gun on himself.17  Clackamas County Sheriff, Craig 
Roberts, said “the death toll would have been higher had the shooter’s assault 
rifle not jammed and law enforcement not responded within minutes of the 
first shot.”18
The incidents in Aurora, Oak Creek, and Portland have undoubtedly in-
vigorated the gun control debate.19  This article argues that although the deci-
michael-page-acted-alone_n_2168229.html (reporting that the FBI concluded Page acted 
alone). 
 13. Miranda Leitsinger, Experts:  Alleged Temple Gunman Wade Michael Page Led Neo-
Nazi Band, Had Deep Extremist Ties, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:48 PM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/06/13147115-experts-alleged-temple-gunman-
wade-michael-page-led-neo-nazi-band-had-deep-extremist-ties. 
 14. Erica Goode & Serge F. Kovaleski, A Killer Who Fed and Was Fueled by Hate, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A1. 
 15. Temple Shooter Bought Gun at Suburban Shop, CHANNEL3000.COM (Aug. 7, 2012, 
3:18 PM), http://www.channel3000.com/news/Temple-shooter-bought-gun-at-suburban-
shop/-/1648/16004660/-/eqy0rf/-/index.html (reporting that Page lawfully purchased the semi-
automatic weapon on July 28, and Page retrieved the firearm on July 30 after clearing a re-
quired background check); see also Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Kim Murphy, Sikh Temple 
Shooting:  Gun Shop Owner Says Wade Page Seemed Normal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012, 
4:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-sikh-shooting-guns-
20120807,0,7536671.story. 
 16. Bacon, supra note 5. 
 17. Rachel La Corte & Steven Dubois, Oregon Mall Shooting:  Gunman Opens Fire at 
Clackamas Town Center Mall in Portland, Kills 2, Self, HUFF POST (Dec. 12, 2012, 8:34 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/oregon-mall-shooting_n_2285243.html. 
 18. Bacon, supra note 5; see also Teresa Carson, Deadly Oregon Mall Shooting Ap-
peared to Be Lone, Random Rampage, REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2012, 6:08 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-usa-shooting-oregon-
idUSBRE8BB01720121212 (stating that “carnage from the shooting likely was limited by the 
fact the gun jammed”); Kirk Johnson & Serge F. Kovaleski, Series of Turning Points Kept 
Mall Toll Lower than Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, at A20 (reporting that although the 
gunman’s assault rifle jammed, he was able to fire approximately sixty rounds); Police ID 
Suspect in Oregon Mall Shooting, Say Gun Jammed Possibly Preventing More Deaths,
FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/12/gun-jammed-in-
oregon-mall-shooting-as-authorities-id-suspect/?test=latestnews (opining that the jamming 
likely prevented additional deaths). 
 19. See Jennifer Brown & Colleen O’Connor, Past Shooting Victims Unite in Urging 
Action, DENVER POST, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1; see also Rick Jervis & John McAuliff, Colo. 
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sion of the Supreme Court of the United States in District of Columbia v. 
Heller (Heller I)20 marks a high point in individual rights under the Second 
Amendment, assault weapons bans nevertheless fall outside of the Second 
Amendment’s scope.21  Further, this article proposes that Congress should 
promptly enact a law proscribing the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
assault weapons due to their propensity to inflict catastrophic violence.22
Part II of this article briefly explores the history of the Second Amend-
ment, including the various modes of its interpretation and the major Su-
preme Court cases in this area.23  This section also concisely defines assault 
weapons and discusses the prevalence of assault weapons bans throughout 
the United States.24
Part III analyzes how lower courts have dealt with challenges to their 
jurisdictions’ assault weapons bans after Heller I was decided.25
Part IV argues that some of these lower court decisions were correctly 
decided, and that Heller I’s holding does not bestow a constitutional right to 
keep and bear assault weapons for any purpose.26  This section also proposes 
a bill, drafted by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, on which Con-
gress should vote to criminalize the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
assault weapons.27
Rampage Adds Fuel to Gun-Control Debate, USA TODAY (July 24, 2012), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-24/aurora-gun-control-
debate/56465980/1.  Surprisingly, however, Americans’ views on gun control laws remain 
relatively unchanged.  THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., VIEWS ON GUNLAWS UNCHANGED AFTER 
AURORA SHOOTING 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/2012/07/30/views-
on-gun-laws-unchanged-after-aurora-shooting/ (stating that “[t]he issue remains a highly 
partisan one:  Republicans prioritize gun rights by a 71% to 26% margin, while Democrats 
prioritize gun control by a 72% to 21% margin”). 
 20. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.A–B; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 25. See discussion infra Part III; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. at 577. 
 26. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. at 625 (citing United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)). 
 27. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Second Amendment and Its Modes of Interpretation 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states:  “A 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”28
The meaning of these twenty-seven words has been the source of 
marked contention.29  Broadly speaking, there are two primary theories of 
interpretation:  A collective people’s right and an individual’s right.30  Indi-
vidual’s right theorists believe that the Second Amendment right should not 
be interpreted differently from other constitutional provisions, which confer 
individual rights.31  Collective people’s right supporters contend that the 
founders’ concern regarding the Second Amendment primarily revolved 
around “the allocation of military power,” and as a result, the right conferred 
is a collective people’s right.32  “Each side of the debate claims that its view 
is in accord with the” framers’ intent.33  Each side also maintains that its in-
terpretation is in line with the original and plain meanings.34  To be sure, 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 29. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 26 (3d ed. 
2006) (referring to the Second Amendment as a source of “heated debate among scholars” and 
laymen alike). 
 30. See id.; see also Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 793, 793–94, 794 n.2, 810 (1998); David Yassky, The Second Amendment:  Structure, 
History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 613 (2000). 
 31. Volokh, supra note 30, at 794, 810 (stating that the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amend-
ments use the phrase “‘the right of the people’” and there is general agreement that those 
amendments confer individual rights; similarly, the Second Amendment confers such a right);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 32. See Yassky, supra note 30, at 598–99, 620–21 n.130 (stating that “the Second 
Amendment speaks only of ‘the people’ in their collective capacity as militiamen”); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 27.  Compare Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 
1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Second Amendment protects only a collective people’s 
right to keep and bear arms), abrogated in part by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008), with United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms). 
 34. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 16–17 (2009) (stating that individ-
ual right theorists maintain that “‘people’ is primarily [used] in the Bill of Rights when refer-
ring to the individual,” and consequently the Second Amendment protects individuals.  Col-
lective right theorists, on the other hand, contend “that because the militia was composed of a 
[group] of people . . . the ‘right to keep and bear arms’ can only be exercised by the collective 
people when . . . servi[ng] [in] the militia.”); see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’
SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 325 (2008) (examining the early 
6
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these modes of interpretation do not produce any satisfying answer to the 
question of which right the Second Amendment confers.  The case law, then, 
must be analyzed to address this issue. 
B. Major Supreme Court Decisions Pertaining to the Second Amendment 
1. United States v. Cruikshank:  The Second Amendment’s Inapplicability 
to the States 
United States v. Cruikshank35 was the first Supreme Court case that di-
rectly addressed the Second Amendment.36  In that case—which centered on 
the Colfax massacre in Louisiana—the defendants were charged with violat-
ing a federal statute prohibiting individuals from conspiring to deprive other 
individuals of their constitutionally-protected rights.37  A Second Amend-
ment issue arose—not because the defendants confiscated the black citizens’ 
firearms or prevented them from joining the state militia—but because the 
defendants prevented the black citizens from voting and thereby restricted 
them from bearing arms.38
In addressing the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim, the Court 
agreed with the plaintiffs that the Second Amendment declares that the right 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.39  The Court clarified, however, 
that this right “means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Con-
gress,” and as a result, the Second Amendment is not a restraint on state gov-
ernments or private individuals.40
dictionary definition of “‘people,’” which includes “‘persons in general’” and “‘the common-
alty [sic], as distinct from men of rank,’” and subsequently determining that “‘the people’” 
refers to individuals); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE 
RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 168–211 (2002) (analyzing 
briefly the scholarly contributions of Sanford Levinson, Carl Bogus, William Van Alstyne, 
Akhil Reed Amar, and David Yassky, and determining that these learned authors support 
disparate views). 
 35. 92 U.S. 542 (1875), abrogated by McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 36. CHARLES, supra note 34, at 64 (stating that this case marked the first time that the 
Supreme Court gave “the Second Amendment any significant attention”); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. II. 
 37. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548; JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT 
MEMOIR 22–23 (2011) (describing the sociopolitical and legal circumstances surrounding the 
Colfax massacre). 
 38. CHARLES, supra note 34, at 64 (stating that the Second Amendment became an issue 
in addition to the right to peacefully assemble and the right to enjoy life and liberty); see
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 39. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 40. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553 (stating further that “[t]his is one of the amendments that 
has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government”); see also U.S.
7
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2. Presser v. Illinois:  A Narrow Second Amendment 
Just eleven years after Cruikshank came Presser v. lllinois,41 in which 
the plaintiff contested an Illinois law that made it unlawful for citizens to 
assemble and form a militia bearing arms without the express consent of the 
governor.42  The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the law violated the Second 
Amendment.43
The Court reaffirmed its core holding in Cruikshank and confirmed that 
the Second Amendment prohibits “only . . . the power[s] of Congress and the 
National [G]overnment.”44  The Second Amendment did not protect the 
plaintiff’s purported right to keep and bear arms because neither Congress 
nor the National Government enacted the law at issue and the state govern-
ment did not eliminate its militia.45  The Court further explained that al-
though states cannot enact laws that eviscerate the militia force, any law 
short of that would not be invalidated by the Second Amendment.46
3. United States v. Miller:  The “Well-Regulated Militia” Requirement 
United States v. Miller47 was perhaps the most important Supreme Court 
decision pertaining to the Second Amendment prior to 2008.48  In that case, 
the defendants were indicted for possessing a shotgun with “a barrel less than 
[eighteen] inches” in violation of a federal statute.49  The trial court quashed 
the indictment, holding that the law violated the defendants’ Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.50
CONST. amend. II; STEVENS, supra note 37, at 23 (stating that this “unfortunate decision paved 
the way for continued racial violence and the enactment of state laws throughout the South 
that deprived blacks of full citizenship for decades”). 
 41. 116 U.S. 252 (1886); see generally Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. 
 42. Presser, 116 U.S. at 262. 
 43. Id. at 264. 
 44. Id. at 265; see also Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
 45. Presser, 116 U.S. at 264–65. 
 46. Id. at 265. 
 47. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 48. With that said, however, Miller has also been heavily criticized by commentators due 
to its brevity and relatively simplistic analysis.  See, e.g., BRIAN DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON 
TRIAL: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BATTLE OVER THE SECOND AMENDMENT 15 (2008) (“Mil-
ler is an unusual case on which to rest an entire edifice of constitutional interpretation.”); see
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 34, at 18–19 (characterizing Miller as “problematic from the 
standpoint of Second Amendment doctrine” because people arguing from each side of the 
aisle repeatedly “read the same language from the Miller opinion as confirming” its view). 
 49. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. 
 50. Id. at 177. 
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Hearing the case on direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court’s ruling, and issued the following, now famous, statement: 
 In the absence of any evidence tending to show that posses-
sion or use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen 
inches in length” at this time has some reasonable relationship to 
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot 
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and 
bear such an instrument.  Certainly it is not within judicial notice 
that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or 
that its use could contribute to the common defense.51
For many decades, Miller was understood to stand for the proposition 
that the Second Amendment conferred a right only in connection with militia 
service.52  That is to say that Miller turned on whether the weapon at issue 
was connected to the militia; it did not hinge on whether the individual was 
connected to the militia.53
C. How Do Assault Weapons Fit Into All of This? 
Assault weapons may be thought of as semiautomatic firearms that re-
quire an individual trigger pull to discharge each bullet.54  After one bullet is 
discharged, “the cartridge automatically reloads in preparation for the next 
shot.”55  Fully automatic firearms, in contrast, discharge bullets so long as the 
trigger is being pulled.56
In 1994, Congress passed a ten-year ban on assault weapons.57  The ban 
reached its sunset in 2004.58  The law “ban[ned] the manufacture, sale, and 
 51. Id. at 178 (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840)).  Interest-
ingly, the Court did not quickly conclude that the defendants were not members of a militia; to 
the contrary, it declared that all males are capable of constituting the militia, but, nevertheless, 
a sawed-off shotgun has no relation to any militia.  See DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 17. 
 52. Id.; see UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 34, at 18–19. 
 53. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 34, at 18–19; see also Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. 
 54. Daniel Abrams, Comment, Ending the Other Arms Race:  An Argument for a Ban on 
Assault Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 491 (1992). 
 55. Id.; see also Assault Weapons Policy Summary, supra note 2 (stating that these weap-
ons allow for “rapid and accurate spray firing”). 
 56. See Abrams, supra note 54, at 491–92 (analogizing fully automatic weapons with 
machine guns). 
 57. Assault Weapon Ban Expires, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:52 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/13/politics/main642984.shtml; David Johnston & 
Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Signs Crime Bill into Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 14, 
1994, at A8. 
 58. See Assault Weapon Ban Expires, supra note 57. 
9
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possession of 19 [specific] assault weapons.”59  The regulations promulgated 
under the assault weapons ban contained many definitions.60
First, the regulations listed the nineteen specific weapons by make and 
model number.61  Second, the regulations included in its definition semiau-
tomatic rifles that can accept detachable magazines and have at least two of 
the following:  “(1) A folding or telescoping stock, (2) [a] pistol grip that 
protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon, (3) [a] bayonet 
mount, (4) [a] flash suppressor or threaded barrel designed to accommodate a 
flash suppressor, and (5) [a] grenade launcher.”62  Third, the regulations in-
cluded in its definition semiautomatic pistols that can accept a detachable 
magazine and have at least two of the following: 
(1) An ammunition magazine that attaches to the pistol outside of 
the pistol grip, (2) [a] threaded barrel capable of acceptable a bar-
rel extender, flash suppressor, forward handgrip, or silencer, (3) [a] 
shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the 
barrel and that permits the shooter to hold the firearm with the 
nontrigger hand without being burned, (4) [a] manufactured weight 
of 50 ounces or more when the pistol is unloaded, and (5) [a] sem-
iautomatic version of an automatic firearm.63
Fourth, the regulations included in its definition semiautomatic shotguns that 
have at least two of the following:  “(1) A folding or telescoping stock, (2) 
[a] pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon, 
(3) [a] fixed magazine capacity in excess of [five] rounds, and (4) [a]n ability 
to accept a detachable magazine.”64
These definitions are helpful when attempting to grasp the precise no-
tion of an assault weapon.65  For a simpler definition, it may be useful to con-
sider three factors in determining whether a particular firearm is an assault 
weapon:  (1) Military appearance, (2) likelihood and ease of transformation 
into a fully automatic weapon, and (3) cartridge size.66
Aside from the Federal Assault Weapons Ban of 1994, numerous state 
and municipal jurisdictions have implemented similar assault weapons bans 
 59. Johnston & Holmes, supra note 57. 
 60. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (2002). 
 61. Id. § 178.11, at 1139. 
 62. Id. § 178.11, at 1139–40. 
 63. Id. § 178.11, at 1140. 
 64. Id.
 65. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.11. 
 66. Abrams, supra note 54, at 492 (stating that these are the factors that the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms use in identifying weapons as assault weapons). 
10
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to thwart the dangerous propensity of these firearms.67  Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heller I, there was little doubt that assault weapons bans 
were constitutional and not in violation of the Second Amendment.  The 
question emerges then, whether Heller I changed the constitutional landscape 
of assault weapons bans.68
D. Heller I:  Shaking the Second Amendment Terrain 
In Heller I, the Supreme Court addressed the Second Amendment head-
on for the first time in nearly seven decades when it was called to decide 
whether a District of Columbia ban on handguns in the home is constitu-
tional.69  The District of Columbia criminalized the possession of an unregis-
tered handgun, and handgun registration was prohibited, thereby effectuating 
a handgun ban.70
The Court first thoroughly examined the meaning of the Second 
Amendment, and in particular, its linguistic components.71  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court that was split on ideological lines, analyzed the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause—“right of the people to keep and bear 
 67. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding Cali-
fornia’s assault weapons ban), abrogated in part by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008); Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 525–26, 539 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (citing Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 252 (6th Cir. 
1994)) (examining Columbus’s assault weapons ban); Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City 
of N.Y., 97 F.3d 681, 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding New York City’s assault weapons 
ban); Coal. of N.J. Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman, 44 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669, 693 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(upholding New Jersey’s assault weapons ban); Robertson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 874 
P.2d 325, 335–36 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (upholding Denver’s assault weapons ban); Benja-
min v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1228, 1242 (Conn. 1995) (upholding Connecticut’s assault 
weapons ban); City of Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ohio 2006) (upholding 
Cincinnati’s assault weapons ban); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166, 173, 
175 (Ohio 1993) (upholding Cleveland’s assault weapons ban).  Of course, those cases were 
all decided before Heller I. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 68. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 69. Id. at 573; DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 15.  As a background note, the idea to chal-
lenge the District of Columbia’s handgun ban was very well thought out and methodical.  See
DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 23 (crediting Robert Levy, a renowned libertarian, as the organ-
izer and financier of the effort). 
 70. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 574–75.  For the pertinent statutory provisions, please see sec-
tions 7-2501.01(10), (12), 7-2502.01, 7-2502.02, 7-2551.01, and 7-2551.02 of the District of 
Columbia Code. 
 71. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 579–99; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
11
Roth: Reconsidering a Federal Assault Weapons Ban in the Wake of the Au
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
416 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
[a]rms”—and its prefatory clause—“[a] well regulated Militia, being neces-
sary to the security of a free State.”72
With regard to the operative clause, the Court determined that “the peo-
ple” could refer to only the individual, especially in light of the Fourth and 
Ninth Amendments’ use of “the people.”73  The Court also discovered that 
“[n]owhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ 
refer to anything other than an individual right.”74  The Court further stated 
that “the most natural reading of ‘keep [and bear] Arms’ . . . is to ‘have [and 
carry] weapons.’”75  This right applied to militiamen and ordinary citizens 
alike.76
With respect to the prefatory clause, the Court concluded that this lan-
guage merely “announces the purpose for which the right was codified:  [T]o 
prevent elimination of the militia.”77  Nothing in the prefatory clause indi-
cates that the sole reason that the right to keep and bear arms exists was to 
maintain the militia.78
After concluding this analysis, the Court then compared the Second 
Amendment to analogous state constitutional provisions enacted at the time 
of the Constitution’s ratification.79  Specifically, the Court referenced the 
constitutional provisions that confer the right to bear arms in Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, North Carolina, and Massachusetts:  “defence of themselves,” “de-
fence of the State,” and “the common defence,” respectively.80  The Court 
determined that the only logical conclusion was that these state constitutions 
“secured an individual[’s] right to [keep and] bear arms for [self-defense],” 
and consequently that was the original understanding of the federal constitu-
tional provision at the time.81
The Court turned next to the historical interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, including its own case law, from the amendment’s ratification 
up to the present case.82  The Court analyzed the post-ratification commen-
 72. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 577, 579–98 (citations omitted); see also HALBROOK, supra note 
34, at 337 (stating that the founders intended the Constitution to be readable by any citizen, 
and that an “exhaustive textual analysis of the Second Amendment” became necessary only in 
the last half-century). 
 73. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 579 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV, IX). 
 74. Id. at 580. 
 75. Id. at 582 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II). 
 76. Id. at 583. 
 77. Id. at 599. 
 78. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 79. Id. at 600–03. 
 80. Id. at 601. 
 81. Id. at 602–03. 
 82. Id. at 605–26. 
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tary of St. George Tucker, William Rawle, and Joseph Story.83  It then con-
sidered relevant pre-Civil War case law,84 including Houston v. Moore,85
Nunn v. State,86 State v. Chandler,87 and Aymette v. State.88  After that, the 
Court examined the post-Civil War commentators and legislation.89  The 
Court also analyzed its own precedents in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller.90
After an extensive and exhaustive evaluation, the Court concluded that 
the “Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms,” 
and it rejected the argument that the amendment applies only in connection 
with militia service.91  As a result, the District of Columbia handgun ban was 
unconstitutional, because “the inherent right of self-defense has been central 
to the Second Amendment right.”92  The Court determined that the District of 
Columbia law prohibited an entire class of weapons that are most popular 
among American citizens for self-defense, and this ban extended to an indi-
vidual’s home where the need for self-defense is paramount.93  The District 
of Columbia handgun ban therefore failed to pass constitutional muster under 
any standard of scrutiny.94
E. McDonald v. City of Chicago:  The Incorporation of the Second 
Amendment to the States 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,95 just two years after Heller I, the 
Court evaluated Chicago and Oak Park laws that effectively amounted to 
handgun bans.96  The Court was faced with the important task of determining 
 83. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 606–10. 
 84. Id. at 610–14. 
 85. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
 86. 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 87. 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850). 
 88. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). 
 89. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 614–19. 
 90. Id. at 619–25; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875), abro-
gated by McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 
264–65 (1886); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 182 (1939). 
 91. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 622. 
 92. Id. at 628. 
 93. Id. at 628–29. 
 94. Id.
 95. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 96. Id. at 3026.  The Chicago “ordinance [stated] that ‘[n]o person shall . . . possess . . . 
any firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such fire-
arm.’”  Id. (second alteration in original).  In a separate provision, the Chicago Municipal 
Code prohibited most handgun registration, thereby “effectively banning handgun possession” 
within Chicago city limits.  Id.  Oak Park had a law that was similar to that of Chicago.  Id.
That law made it “‘unlawful for any person to possess . . . any firearm,’ a term that include[d] 
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whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.97  The Court noted that the 
majority of the Bill of Rights guarantees have been incorporated.98  Indeed, 
only a few of these guarantees have not been incorporated.99
The Court determined that neither Cruikshank nor Presser precluded it 
from considering whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the 
‘pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms . . . commonly known as handguns.’”  McDonald, 130 
S. Ct. at 3026. 
 97. Id. at 3028, 3031.  Heller I did not decide this issue because at issue in that case was 
a District of Columbia handgun ban—as opposed to a state handgun ban—and therefore the 
Court did not determine whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the states.  Heller I,
554 U.S. at 573. 
 98. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034; see also Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) 
(recognizing the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment right against excessive bail); Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (incorporating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 
(1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront an adverse witness); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (incorporating the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement), overruled on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1983); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279 (1991); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (incorporating the 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel), abrogated by Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 
(1979); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amend-
ment right against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 
(1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 278 
(1948) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating the First 
Amendment right to freely assemble); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 
(1931) (incorporating the First Amendment right of the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment right to freely speak); Chi., Burlington & 
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897) (incorporating the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 99. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034, 3035 & n.13.  The Bill of Rights guarantees that have 
not been fully incorporated are “the Third Amendment [right] against [the] quartering of sol-
diers,” the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury, “the Seventh Amendment 
right to a [trial by jury] in civil cases, and . . . the Eighth Amendment[] prohibition [against] 
excessive fines.”  Id. at 3035 n.13. 
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states.100  The Court reasoned that neither of those cases affected the present 
case because the “‘selective incorporation’” under the Due Process Clause 
had yet to begin at the time of those decisions.101  In considering whether the 
right to keep and bear arms is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,’” the Court pointed directly to Heller I itself for guidance.102
As expressed in Heller I, the right to self-defense is at the core of the 
Second Amendment.103  The McDonald Court echoed this sentiment and 
reasoned that, in the absence of stare decisis considerations, the Second 
Amendment is a fundamentally protected right, and it applies to state gov-
ernments with equal force as the federal government.104  Thus, the Court held 
“that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Second Amendment right [as defined] in Heller [I].”105
This begs the question, then, how does the Supreme Court’s Second 
Amendment jurisprudence affect state and local governments in promoting 
assault weapons bans?  Has anything changed since Heller I and McDonald
were decided?  For the following reasons, I argue that assault weapons bans 
remain constitutional. 
 100. Id. at 3031 (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 620 n.23); see also Presser v. Illinois, 116 
U.S. 252, 265 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875), abrograted by
McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 101. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031; see also DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 15 (noting that 
the conclusions in Cruikshank and Presser are outdated in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
trend in selectively incorporating the Bill of Rights). 
 102. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997)) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29). 
 103. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628 (categorizing the right to self-defense as “inherent” and 
“central to the Second Amendment right”). 
 104. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 & n.14 
(1968)). 
 105. Id.; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29.  The Court was not dissuaded by the gov-
ernments’ argument that there are strong, “controversial public safety implications” at stake.  
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045.  The majority simply pointed to other Bill of Rights guarantees 
that have been incorporated to the states despite the possibility of negative public safety im-
plications.  Id.; see, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–92 (2006) (quoting United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)) (reflecting on the immense social costs of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (recogniz-
ing the possibility of extremely harsh consequences resulting from the Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial). 
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III. ANALYSIS
Since the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Heller I, lower courts 
have been increasingly faced with interpreting the Court’s exact holding.106
One of the more difficult areas of interpretation, it seems, has been Heller I’s
applicability to assault weapons bans.107  This section analyzes Heller I’s
progeny in the lower courts with respect to assault weapons bans. 
A. Determining the Applicable Standard of Review 
First, it is useful to examine some of the levels of scrutiny that have 
been applied in Second Amendment cases.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court 
has never articulated the precise level of scrutiny implicated by the Second 
Amendment right.108  As a result, lower courts have struggled to settle on the 
proper standard.109
A minority of courts have applied strict scrutiny in purported accor-
dance with the majority opinion in Heller I, which states that the right to 
keep and bear arms is “pre-existing,” analogizes the right to keep and bear 
arms to other fundamental rights, and asserts “that the right to have arms was 
‘fundamental for English subjects’ at the time of the founding.”110  Strict 
scrutiny requires that a law “be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.”111  Strict scrutiny is not deferential toward government 
policy.112
 106. E.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252–53, 1256, 
1264–67 (D.C. Cir. 2011); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 578–79, 584–86 (Ct. App. 
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010); Wilson v. Cnty. of Cook (Wilson II), 968 N.E.2d 
641, 655–56 (Ill. 2012). 
 107. See, e.g., James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 578–80, 585. 
 108. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (D.D.C. 2010), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 109. See id. at 184–88 (analyzing the variety of approaches applied by lower courts in the 
wake of Heller I).
 110. Id. at 185 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 592–93); see also United States v. Engstrum, 
609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (D. Utah 2009) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 593–94) (applying 
strict scrutiny because Heller I defined the Second Amendment as “fundamental,” and made 
strong comparisons between the Second Amendment right and other fundamental rights that 
were reviewed under strict scrutiny). 
 111. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997). 
 112. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1267, 1269 
(2007) (stating that the strict scrutiny standard is often said to be “‘strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact’”).  But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Ful-
lilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (flatly rejecting that 
strict scrutiny is “‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’” and strongly criticizing the phrase)). 
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Some courts have applied the “undue burden” test, which was first ar-
ticulated in the abortion realm.113  The “undue burden” test treats a law as 
constitutional so long as it does not place “a substantial obstacle in the path” 
of the person attempting to engage in constitutionally permissible conduct.114
The majority of courts, however, have concluded that Second Amend-
ment laws are subject to intermediate scrutiny.115  As a result, this Article 
argues through an intermediate scrutiny lens.  Intermediate scrutiny requires 
that a law “be substantially related to an important governmental” interest.116
B. People v. James
People v. James117 was one of the first and most influential cases to ad-
dress assault weapons bans following the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller 
I.  There, the appellate court reviewed the defendant’s conviction for unlaw-
ful possession of an assault weapon pursuant to the California Penal Code.118
The defendant argued that his conviction was contrary to his Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.119
 113. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (citing Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th 
Cir.), vacated, reh’g granted, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3364 
(2013)); see People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 809 & n.5 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)) (analogizing the Second Amend-
ment right to the abortion right, and holding that a gun restriction will receive heightened 
scrutiny only where it poses an “undue burden” on an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, 
just as with restrictions on the abortion right). 
 114. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 115. Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that the intermediate 
scrutiny standard is appropriate because assault weapons bans “do not impose a substantial 
burden upon [the Second Amendment] right,” and for that same reason, strict scrutiny is not 
the proper standard of review); see United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (opining that intermediate scrutiny is proper in Second Amendment cases, 
and that just because the Supreme Court deemed the Second Amendment a “fundamental 
right,” does not necessarily mean that it is subject to strict scrutiny review because “[t]he 
Court has never purported to apply strict scrutiny in every provision of the Bill of Rights”), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamen-
tal Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 229 (2006) (noting that other rights are considered “‘far 
more fundamental’” than the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms). 
 116. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 117. 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 577.  For the pertinent statutory provisions, please see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 
12275–90 (West 2009) (repealed 2010). 
 119. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 577. 
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In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Court of Appeal of California 
determined that possession of an assault weapon does not fall within the 
scope of the Second Amendment as defined in Heller I.120
The court first pointed to the legislative intent behind the assault weap-
ons ban.121  It found that the legislature was attempting to cure the gigantic 
threat that assault weapons pose to society.122  The legislature proscribed 
particular firearms based on their “high rate of fire and capacity for fire-
power that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure hu-
man beings.”123
With the legislative intent as a backdrop, the court found that Heller I
did not confer a right to possess any type of weapon.124  Although Heller I
does indeed stand for the proposition that an individual may possess a hand-
gun in his home for self-defense, nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion 
suggests that this protection extends to atypical weapons;125 the assault 
weapons classified by the California legislature were “weapons of war.”126
In concluding, the California court found that the assault weapons ban was 
constitutional and noted that the firearms at issue were “at least as dangerous 
and unusual” as the weapon at issue in Miller.127
 120. Id.
 121. Id. at 580–81; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275–90. 
 122. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580–81 (quoting Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 586 (Cal. 
2000)) (describing the widespread use of assault weapons as a “crisis”); see also CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 12275–90. 
 123. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275–90).  The legis-
lature commented that it was merely attempting to protect “the health, safety, and security” of 
California citizens, and it was not interested in legalizing firearms intended for “legitimate 
sports or recreational activities.”  Id. at 580–81 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275–90). 
 124. Id. at 585 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). 
 125. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626, 635. 
 126. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 586. 
 127. Id. (discussing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939)).  This is an interest-
ing conclusion by the California court, because although Heller I certainly did not overrule 
Miller, it did not speak very favorably of the opinion.  See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 623 (chiding 
Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissenting opinion, for placing too much reliance on Miller,
because “the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amend-
ment,” and for that reason it is especially incorrect “to read Miller for more than what it 
said”).  Even with that aside, the court in James repeatedly mentions that it is examining the 
Second Amendment right “as defined in Heller [I],” but then, rather abruptly, reverts back to 
Miller in the end.  James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 586. 
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C. Heller III 
One of the more comprehensive decisions to come down regarding Hel-
ler I’s effect on assault weapons bans is Heller v. District of Columbia (Hel-
ler III).128  Following the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Heller I, the Dis-
trict of Columbia enacted firearm regulations that it seemingly thought were 
constitutional.129  The plaintiffs challenged specific provisions of the District 
of Columbia’s gun laws, including the registration requirement and assault 
weapons prohibition.130
In evaluating the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge against assault 
weapons and large-capacity magazines, the court engaged in a two-part anal-
ysis.131  The court first noted that the record was devoid of any evidence indi-
cating that assault weapons bans are longstanding and thus entitled to a pre-
sumption of legal validity.132
The first part of the court’s analysis sought to answer the question of 
whether “the prohibitions impinge upon the Second Amendment right?”133
Surprisingly, the court stated that assault weapons are in “‘common use,’” as 
described in the majority opinion in Heller I.134  The court noted that al-
though that may be true, assault weapons—even if commonly used—are not 
necessarily used for self-defense.135  As a result, assault weapons bans likely 
do not impinge upon the Second Amendment right.136  The court did not de-
finitively answer the question, though, because it maintained that intermedi-
 128. 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 129. Id. at 1247. 
 130. Id.  The particular law was the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008, which 
amended the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975.  Id.; see also D.C. CODE §§ 7-
2502.01(a), .02(a)(6) (2012), invalidated by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008); Id. §§ 7-2502.03(a), (b), (d), (e), .04(c), .07a(a), (c), (d); Id. § 7-2506.01(b), invali-
dated in part by Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 131. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1260–64. 
 132. Id. at 1260–61. 
 133. Id.
 134. Id. at 1261 (predicating this determination on the fact that “[a]pproximately 1.6 mil-
lion AR-15s alone have been manufactured since 1986, and in 2007 this one popular model 
accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4 percent of all rifles, produced in the U.S. 
for the domestic market”); Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).  The court also considered the 
fact that “fully 18 percent of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were equipped with mag-
azines holding more than ten rounds, and approximately 4.7 million more such magazines 
were imported into the United States between 1995 and 2000.”  Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
 135. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
 136. Id. at 1262. 
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ate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, and the assault weapons 
ban at issue did pass constitutional muster under this standard.137
The second part of the court’s analysis focused on whether the assault 
weapons ban survived intermediate scrutiny.138  The court issued a reminder 
that it is the government that carries the burden of proof under intermediate 
scrutiny.139  Consequently, the District of Columbia was responsible for 
demonstrating that its assault weapons ban bears a substantial relationship to 
its important government interest in crime control and prevention.140
The District of Columbia had no difficulty showing that assault weap-
ons are dangerous.141  It pointed to a series of empirical studies supporting 
the government’s contention that assault weapons are especially likely to 
result in danger for law enforcement personnel because of their “‘high fire-
power.’”142  The government seemingly placed heavy reliance on studies 
evaluating the federal assault weapons ban from 1994 to 2004.143
These studies suggest that assault weapons were “‘most commonly used 
in crime before the [federal assault weapons] ban,’” as opposed to other pur-
poses, such as for hunting or in self-defense.144  Moreover, one study found 
that assault weapons—like the ones at issue in Heller III—“‘account for a 
larger share of guns used in mass murders and murders of police, crimes for 
 137. Id. at 1261–62. 
 138. Id. at 1261–64.  In determining that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate, the court 
noted that the plaintiffs proffered no evidence supporting the assertion that assault weapons 
are encompassed within the core Second Amendment right, which would have heightened the 
level of scrutiny.  Id. at 1262–63.  The court provided an example of how the plaintiffs could 
have done this by pointing to several statistical conclusions from empirical studies.  Heller III,
670 F.3d at 1262 (citing DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, STUDY ON THE SPORTING SUITABILITY OF 
MODIFIED SEMIAUTOMATIC ASSAULT RIFLES 38 (1998), available at
http://www.atf.gov/firearms/industry/april-1998-sporting-suitability-of-modified-
semiautomatic-assault-rifles.pdf; Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime:  The 
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 185 
(1995)).  These statistics suggest that handguns are overwhelmingly used in self-defense, and 
that assault weapons are “‘not generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily 
adaptable to sporting purposes.’”  Id. (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra, at 38). 
 139. Id.
 140. Id.
 141. See Id. at 1262–64. 
 142. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263 (quoting BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
ASSAULT WEAPONS “MASS PRODUCED MAYHEM” 3 (2008)). 
 143. See id. (basing support for its conclusion on two empirical studies). 
 144. Id. at 1263 (quoting CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER WITH DANIEL J. WOODS & JEFFREY A.
ROTH, AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN 
MARKETS AND GUN VIOLENCE, 1994–2003, at 11 (2004), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204431.pdf). 
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which weapons with greater firepower would seem particularly useful.’”145
The same study concluded that crime decreased after the federal assault 
weapons ban was enacted, and for that reason, the District of Columbia ar-
gued that assault weapons bans significantly further its governmental interest 
in crime control and prevention.146
The D.C. Circuit found validity in the government’s argument and 
agreed that its assault weapons ban “promote[d] the [g]overnment’s interest 
in crime control in the densely populated urban area that is the District of 
Columbia.”147  The court concluded by determining that the District of Co-
lumbia “carried its burden of showing [that its law bears] a substantial rela-
tionship” to the important government interest in crime control and preven-
tion.148  Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment 
rights were not violated, and hence the government’s assault weapons ban 
was constitutional.149
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh maintained that the 
District of Columbia’s assault weapons ban was unconstitutional.150  In sup-
port of his position, he noted that “[t]he vast majority of handguns today are 
semi-automatic,” and thus no line can be easily drawn between handguns and 
assault weapons bans in accordance with a close and correct reading of Hel-
ler I.151  In sum, according to Judge Kavanaugh, there is simply no constitu-
tional distinction that can be logically drawn between the handgun ban at 
issue in Heller I and the assault weapons ban at issue in Heller III.152  Judge 
Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion may prove to be instrumental in subsequent 
cases that may ultimately reach the Supreme Court. 
 145. Id. (quoting KOPER WITH WOODS & ROTH, supra note 144, at 87). 
 146. Id. (citing KOPER WITH WOODS & ROTH, supra note 144, at 51). 
 147. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263. 
 148. Id. at 1264. 
 149. Id.
 150. Id. at 1269 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  Judge Kavanaugh is generally viewed as a 
very conservative jurist.  Charlie Savage, Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at A1.  “[H]e was Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary to 
President [George W.] Bush.”  Brett M. Kavanaugh, U.S. CTS. OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+BMK (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2013).  He was also a law clerk for Justice Kennedy.  Id.  It may be safe to assume 
that Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion adequately represents at least one traditionally 
conservative perspective on the constitutionality of assault weapons bans.  See Heller III, 670 
F.3d at 1269–70. 
 151. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1286. 
 152. Id. at 1289 (stating that “[t]he fundamental flaw in the majority opinion is that it 
cannot persuasively explain why semi-automatic handguns are constitutionally protected (as 
Heller [I] held) but semi-automatic rifles are not.”). 
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D. Wilson v. County of Cook (Wilson II)
In 1993, Cook County, Illinois enacted an ordinance that banned spe-
cific firearms defined as assault weapons.153  The Cook County Board of 
Commissioners determined that these particular weapons needed to be out-
lawed due to their uniquely dangerous attributes.154  Recently, a group of 
plaintiffs decided to challenge the ordinance’s constitutionality.155  “The trial 
court dismissed [the] plaintiffs’ first amended complaint,” determining that 
the ordinance did not violate the right to keep and bear arms under either the 
United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution.156  In what became a 
particularly interesting procedural history, the plaintiffs first appealed fol-
lowing the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller I.157  The appellate court 
found in favor of Cook County, as it interpreted Heller I to extend only to 
federal laws.158  Immediately thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a petition for 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois; however during the time 
when the petition was pending, McDonald was decided.159  The Supreme 
Court of Illinois directed the appellate court to vacate its prior holding and 
reconsider its ruling in light of McDonald.160
The plaintiffs’ argument was that they possessed a Second Amendment 
right—as interpreted in Heller I and applied to the states in McDonald—to 
keep and bear arms, including the purported “assault weapons” prohibited by 
the ordinance.161  The plaintiffs further contended that many of the pro-
scribed firearms were actually commonly owned, and as such, they were well 
within the scope of Heller I.162  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling once again, holding “that the [S]econd [A]mendment right does not 
extend to assault weapons and that the [o]rdinance is substantially related to 
 153. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. 2012). 
 154. See id.  Among the commissioners’ findings were: 
1,000 of the 4,500 trauma cases handled by [the] Cook County Hospital that year were due to 
gunshot wounds; there were more federally licensed gun dealers in Cook County than gas sta-
tions; an estimated 1 in 20 high school students had carried a gun in the prior month; and as-
sault weapons [were] 20 times more likely to be used in the commission of a crime than other 
kinds of weapons. 
Wilson v. Cook Cnty. (Wilson I), 943 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted, 949 
N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). 
 155. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 646. 
 156. Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d at 770. 
 157. See Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 647. 
 158. Id.
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.
 161. Id. at 646–47. 
 162. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 656. 
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an important government[al] interest.”163  The plaintiffs appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Illinois.164
In reversing the trial court with regard to the plaintiffs’ Second 
Amendment claim, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the plaintiffs suf-
ficiently pleaded a cause of action for a constitutional violation.165  The court 
reasoned that, given the procedural posture of the case, it could not evaluate 
the nexus between the assault weapons ban and the interest sought to be pro-
tected.166  The court was not willing to determine that “no set of facts [could] 
be proved that would entitle plaintiffs to relief on” their Second Amendment 
claim.167  The court further stated: 
 Plaintiffs seek to present evidence to support their allegation 
that this particular Ordinance encompasses a myriad of weapons 
that are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
poses and fall outside the scope of the dangers sought to be pro-
tected under the Ordinance.  Without a national uniform definition 
of assault weapons from which to judge these weapons, it cannot 
be ascertained at this stage of the proceedings whether these arms 
with these particular attributes as defined in this Ordinance are 
well suited for self-defense or sport or would be outweighed com-
pletely by the collateral damage resulting from their use, making 
them “dangerous and unusual” as articulated in Heller [I].  This 
question requires us to engage in an empirical inquiry beyond the 
scope of the record and beyond the scope of judicial notice about 
the nature of the weapons that are banned under this Ordinance 
and the dangers of these particular weapons.168
In essence, the court refused to interpret McDonald and Heller I as categori-
cally permitting the proscription of assault weapons and it opted not to fol-
low James and Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II)169 on that score.170
 163. Id. at 647 (citing Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d 768, 780–81 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted,
949 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012)). 
 164. Id.
 165. Id. at 657. 
 166. Id.
 167. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 657. 
 168. Id. at 656. 
 169. 698 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 670 F.3d 1244 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 170. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 656–57. 
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IV. PROPOSAL
I propose that Heller II and James were indeed correctly decided, and 
that assault weapons bans are constitutional, consistent with Heller I’s core 
holding. 
A. Assault Weapons Bans Do Not Implicate the Core Second Amendment 
Right, and Consequently These Bans Need Not Survive Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Heller I was very narrow:  “In sum, we 
hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the 
Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful 
firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”171
Self-defense is undoubtedly at the core of the Second Amendment right.172
Moreover, the Court’s decision expressly encompasses handguns in the 
home.173  Assault weapons, as previously articulated, are neither generally 
used in self-defense nor are they handguns, and for those two reasons, assault 
weapons fall outside of the scope of Heller I.174
 171. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 172. Id. at 628, 632 (stating that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the 
Second Amendment right” and that the historical underpinnings of this right support this 
conclusion). 
 173. Id. at 635.  But see Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1788, 2012 WL 6156062, at *9 (7th 
Cir. Dec. 11, 2012) (holding that Illinois’s ban on ready-to-use guns in public is unconstitu-
tional).  In Moore, the Seventh Circuit was charged with interpreting the holdings of McDon-
ald and Heller I. Id. at *3, *9.  Judge Posner, writing for the majority, stated: 
To confine the right to be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the 
right of self-defense described in Heller [I] and McDonald.
 A gun is a potential danger to more people if carried in public than just kept in the home. 
. . . . 
 A blanket prohibition on carrying gun [sic] in public prevents a person from defending 
himself anywhere except inside his home; and so substantial a curtailment of the right of 
armed self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might
benefit on balance from such a curtailment, though there is no proof it would. 
. . . . 
The Supreme Court has decided that the [Second A]mendment confers a right to bear arms for 
self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.  The theoretical and empirical 
evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is consistent with concluding that a right to carry fire-
arms in public may promote self-defense. 
Id. at *3–4, *7, *9. 
 174. See Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (expressing uncertainty as to 
“whether [assault] weapons are commonly used . . . for self-defense” purposes).  Heller III
also reflects on testimony put on by the government that supports the claim that, even if as-
sault weapons are sometimes used in self-defense, “‘the tendency is for defenders to keep 
firing until all bullets have been expended, which poses grave risks to others in the household, 
passersby, and bystanders.’”  Id. at 1263–64.  That is to say that there are other extrinsic re-
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller I conceded that the 
Second Amendment is not so robust that it evades all limitation.175  Indeed, 
the Court explicitly recognized that the “longstanding prohibitions” on cer-
tain types of weapons are not necessarily altered by its opinion in Heller I.176
Although Heller I lists only a few examples of longstanding prohibitions on 
the right to keep and bear arms, there is nothing in the opinion that suggests 
that this is an exclusive or exhaustive list.177  Thus, it can be convincingly 
said that our Nation’s longstanding prohibition on assault weapons need not 
be disturbed.178
Additional support for this proposition can be found later in the opin-
ion.179  The Court cited Miller favorably and mentioned that that decision 
protected only weapons “‘in common use at the time.’”180  The Court inter-
preted this as a prohibition against the possession of “‘dangerous and unusual 
weapons.’”181  Numerous authoritative studies support the contention that 
assault weapons are “‘dangerous and unusual’” weapons, and for that reason, 
they are unprotected by the Second Amendment.182  Certainly, if assault 
weapons were not considered “dangerous and unusual,” one would have a 
troublesome time imagining which weapons would qualify as such. 
For these reasons, it appears evident that assault weapons bans do not 
implicate the core Second Amendment right.183  Consequently, these bans 
percussions that must be considered in concluding that assault weapons are used in self-
defense. 
 175. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”). 
 176. Id. at 626–27 & n.26 (providing examples of classic firearm prohibitions, such as 
“possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of fire-
arms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing condi-
tions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms”). 
 177. Id.
 178. See id.  Assault weapons are admittedly a relatively recent development.  Neverthe-
less—as aforementioned—governments have sought to control and ban assault weapons since 
their inception.  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 179. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 180. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 181. Id.
 182. See Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 
at 627) (discussing several studies that describe assault weapons as tools that facilitate “‘mass 
produced mayhem’” and “‘are designed to enhance their capacity to shoot multiple human 
targets very rapidly’”).  In a society that values the sanctity of life, these weapons certainly 
can be thought of as “‘dangerous and unusual.’”  Id. at 1263 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 
627). 
 183. Id. at 1264. 
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need not be subjected to intermediate scrutiny and are therefore constitution-
ally consistent with Heller I.184
B. Even Assuming, Arguendo, that Assault Weapons Bans Do Implicate the 
Core Second Amendment Right, These Bans Nevertheless Pass Constitu-
tional Muster Under Intermediate Scrutiny 
Even assuming, arguendo, that assault weapons bans do implicate the 
core Second Amendment right—that is, assault weapons are found to be used 
in self-defense—these bans withstand the intermediate scrutiny analysis.185
1. Governments Have an Important Governmental Interest in Banning 
Assault Weapons 
Governments have an important governmental interest in banning as-
sault weapons, because these bans aid in crime control and prevention, and in 
that sense, they enhance safety.186  The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence 
concluded that assault weapons are unique firearms in that they are not used 
for “sport,” as are many other lawful firearms.187  To the contrary, assault 
weapons are strongly conducive to accurate and efficient spray firing.188  In 
other words, these firearms make it easier to kill.189  And, not only that, these 
guns make it easier to kill a larger number of individuals than more tradi-
tional classes of firearms.190  The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence found 
that assault weapons have been increasingly used against law enforcement 
agents; in particular, because assault weapons have proliferated within drug 
and gang communities.191
Courts have long recognized governments’ interest in preserving and 
enhancing public safety.192  In one heavily cited Supreme Court decision, 
Justice John Marshall Harlan said: 
 184. Id. app. at 1266. 
 185. See id. at 1263–64. 
 186. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263 (stating that “[i]n short, the evidence demonstrates a 
ban on assault weapons is likely to promote the Government’s interest in crime control”). 
 187. Assault Weapons Policy Summary, supra note 2; see also People v. James, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 576, 580–81 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010). 
 188. Assault Weapons Policy Summary, supra note 2. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id.
 191. Id.; see also Robertson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 333 (Colo. 1994) 
(en banc) (explaining that assault weapons are easily concealed and therefore are likely to be 
used to accomplish criminal objectives). 
 192. See, e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 263, 268–69 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(upholding a gun control ordinance that was expressly directed at preserving safety); Benja-
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There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily 
subject for the common good.  On any other basis organized soci-
ety could not exist with safety to its members.  Society based on 
the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be con-
fronted with disorder and anarchy.  Real liberty for all could not 
exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right 
of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his 
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to 
others.  This court has more than once recognized it as a funda-
mental principle that “persons and property are subjected to all 
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general com-
fort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right of the 
legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowl-
edged general principles ever can be made, so far as natural per-
sons are concerned.”193
This passage truly illuminates the rationale for why safety is an important 
governmental interest:  Safety, in certain circumstances, can actually pro-
mote the curtailment of certain rights.  In that sense, then, it can hardly be 
argued that safety is anything other than an important governmental interest 
if it has stood to restrict other fundamental rights.  Perhaps it is axiomatic to 
state that a democratic society values the safety of all of its citizens, and, 
without which, it would fail to operate effectively—or maybe even cease to 
operate at all. 
2.  Assault Weapons Bans Bear a Substantial Relationship to Governments’ 
Important Governmental Interest 
Assault weapons bans, like the ones in Heller III, James, and Wilson v. 
County of Cook (Wilson II),194 bear a substantial relationship to the govern-
ments’ important interests in crime control and prevention.195  The bans are 
min v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Conn. 1995) (arguing that states have traditionally been 
able “to protect the health, safety and morals of the citizenry”); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 
595, 597 (Neb. 1989) (quoting Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 351 
N.W.2d 701, 703 (Neb. 1984)) (asserting that the public safety and welfare are undoubtedly 
sound reasons to regulate the right to keep and bear arms). 
 193. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. 
Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 629 (1898); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877); Thorpe 
v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1855)). 
 194. 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). 
 195. See Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2011); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 576, 586 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010); Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 
647 (citing Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d 768, 780–81 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted, 949 N.E.2d 1104 
(Ill. 2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012)). 
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incredibly specific and tightly worded to fit this objective, as the legislation 
at issue in these cases list specific brands and models that are proscribed.196
In these cases, the government proscribed particular assault weapons based 
on legislative findings that these weapons pose a direct and uncontroverted 
threat to society at large.197  While it is true that legislative bodies are not 
entirely insulated from judicial review, legislatures must be afforded “sub-
stantial deference” so long as their conclusions have been based on substan-
tial evidence.198
Furthermore, the assault weapons bans at issue in Heller III, James, and 
Wilson v. Cook County (Wilson I),199 do not criminalize the category of fire-
arms that is “overwhelmingly chosen by American society”—non-
semiautomatic handguns.200  Those bans target only weapons that are nar-
rowly defined as “assault weapons” in an effort to promote the important 
governmental interest in public safety and crime control and prevention.201
Most other types of firearms remain available for lawful use.202  Thus, it can-
not be credibly argued that similar assault weapons bans are not a substantial 
fit to further the government’s important governmental interest. 
 196. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1248–49; James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 579–80 nn.5–6; Wil-
son II, 968 N.E.2d at 648–49. 
 197. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261 (citing reports on the District of Columbia legislation 
that found that “assault weapons ‘have no legitimate use as self-defense weapons, and would 
in fact increase the danger to law-abiding users and innocent bystanders if kept in the home or 
used in self-defense situations’”); James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580 (recognizing the legislative 
intent behind the assault weapons ban at issue:  “‘The Legislature hereby finds and declares 
that the proliferation and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and 
security of all citizens of this state.  The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons speci-
fied in Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and 
capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill human beings’”); Wilson II, 968 
N.E.2d at 656 (stating that the ordinance at issue set forth numerous findings indicating that 
“‘there is no legitimate sporting purpose for the military style assault weapons now being used 
on our streets,’ and that ‘assault weapons are twenty times more likely to be used in the com-
mission of a crime than other kinds of weapons’”). 
 198. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994). 
 199. 943 N.E.2d 768 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted, 949 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011), and aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). 
 200. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (stating that handguns constitute the most popular 
class of firearms for self-defense purposes); Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261–62; James, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 577, 579 n.5; Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d at 781. 
 201. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1249, 1262–63; James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580; Wilson I,
943 N.E.2d at 771. 
 202. See James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580–81. 
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C. There Is Strong Public Support in Favor of Banning Assault Weapons, 
and Therefore Congress Should Enact Legislation Criminalizing the Manu-
facture, Sale, and Possession of Assault Weapons 
Recent polls strongly suggest that the general public is in favor of re-
stricting the “manufacture, sale, and possession of . . . assault [weapons].”203
One poll reveals that approximately 62% of Americans are in favor of 
“ban[ning] the sale of semi-automatic assault weapons, [with a limited] ex-
cept[ion] for use by the military or police.”204  Another nationwide poll sug-
gests that 57% of Americans are in favor of banning the “manufacture, sale, 
and possession of [some] semi-automatic [weapons], such as . . . AK-
47[s].”205  Shockingly, “a majority of gun-owning households [support a na-
tionwide] ban on assault weapons, although by [an admittedly] smaller mar-
gin.”206
Also, in the aftermath of the expiration of the federal assault weapons 
ban in 2004, polls indicated that 61% of Americans were dissatisfied with its 
expiration, whereas only 12% were satisfied with its expiration.207  Addition-
ally, polls at the time suggest that Democrats, Republicans, and Independents 
alike favored extending the federal assault weapons ban, thereby indicating 
the support of assault weapons bans across the political spectrum.208  In other 
words, the issue seemingly transcends traditional political cleavages. 
Due to strong public support, Congress should once again enact legisla-
tion criminalizing the manufacture, sale, and possession of assault weap-
ons.209  The following is a proposed law drafted by the Law Center to Prevent 
 203. ORC INT’L, CNN/ORC POLL 3 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/08/09/rel7a.pdf; see, e.g., Frank James, Little Elec-
tion-Year Incentive for Obama or Romney to Join Gun Debate, NPR (July 23, 2012, 5:40 
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/07/23/157230177/little-election-year-
incentive-for-obama-or-romney-to-join-gun-debate (reporting a recent Time poll from June 
2011). 
 204. Guns (p. 2), POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 205. ORC INT’L, supra note 203, at 3. 
 206. CBS NEWS & NY TIMES, POLL: THE ECONOMY, THE BUDGET DEFICIT AND GUN
CONTROL (2011), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/Jan11_Econ.pdf?tag=contentMain;contentBody.  This 
poll also suggests that there has been an increase in overall public support for a nationwide 
assault weapons ban since 2009.  Id.
 207. Guns (p. 2), supra note 204 (referencing a poll conducted by NBC News and the 
Wall Street Journal in September 2004). 
 208. Id. (referencing a poll conducted by the Harris Poll in September 2004). 
 209. See id.  Indeed, some lawmakers, such as Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), have 
reportedly taken steps to reintroduce a federal assault weapons ban.  Ryan Keller, Senator 
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Gun Violence (formerly the Legal Community Against Violence), modified 
for adoption by Congress.210  The law encompasses ideas from the 1994 fed-
eral assault weapons ban and has many commonalities with the assault 
weapons bans at issue in Heller III, James, and Wilson II211:
1. Findings 
. . . . 
Whereas assault weapons are semi-automatic firearms designed 
with military features to allow rapid and accurate spray firing for 
the quick and efficient killing of humans; 
Whereas assault weapons have been the weapon of choice in many 
mass shootings of innocent civilians; 
Whereas assault weapon shootings are responsible for a significant 
percentage of the deaths of law enforcement officers killed in the 
line of duty; 
Whereas approximately [two] million assault weapons are already 
in circulation in the United States; 
Whereas the wide availability of assault weapons is a serious risk 
to public health and safety; 
Whereas most citizens—including most gun owners—support as-
sault weapons bans and believe that assault weapons should not be 
available for civilian use; 
Therefore, the [United States Congress] hereby adopts the follow-
ing: 
Feinstein Looking to Introduce New Assault Weapons Ban, EXAMINER.COM (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/senator-feinstein-looking-to-introduce-new-assault-
weapons-ban. 
 210. See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, BANNING ASSAULT WEAPONS—A LEGAL 
PRIMER FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION 58 (2004), available at http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Banning_Assault_Weapons_A_Legal_Primer_8.05_entire.pdf. 
 211. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994); Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 578–80 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1517 (2010); Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d 641, 648–49 (Ill. 2012). 
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2. Definitions 
(a) “Assault weapon” means any: 
(1)  Semi-automatic or pump-action rifle that has the capacity to 
accept  a detachable magazine and has one or more of the follow-
ing: 
(i) A pistol grip; 
(ii) Any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that 
can be held by the non-trigger hand; 
(iii) A folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; 
(iv) A shroud attached to the barrel, or that partially or  completely 
encircles the barrel, allowing the bearer to hold the firearm with 
the non-trigger hand without being burned, but excluding a slide 
that encloses the barrel; or 
(v) A muzzle brake or muzzle compensator. 
(2) Semi-automatic pistol, or any semi-automatic, centerfire rifle 
with a fixed magazine, that has the capacity to accept more than 
[ten] rounds of ammunition; 
(3) Semi-automatic pistol that has the capacity to accept a detach-
able magazine and has one or more of the following: 
(i) Any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that 
can be held by the non-trigger hand; 
(ii) A folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; 
(iii) A shroud attached to the barrel, or that partially or  completely 
encircles the barrel, allowing the bearer to hold the firearm with 
the non-trigger hand without being burned, but excluding a slide 
that encloses the barrel; 
(iv) A muzzle brake or muzzle compensator; or 
(v) The capacity to accept a detachable magazine at any    
 location outside of the pistol grip; 
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(4) Semi-automatic shotgun that has one or more of the following  
(i) A pistol grip; 
(ii) Any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that 
can be held by the non-trigger hand; 
(iii) A folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; 
(iv) A fixed magazine capacity in excess of 5 rounds; or 
(v) An ability to accept a detachable magazine; 
(5) Shotgun with a revolving cylinder; 
(6) Conversion kit, part, or combination of parts, from which an 
assault weapon can be assembled if those parts are in the posses-
sion or under the control of the same person[s]. 
(b) “Assault weapon” does not include any firearm that has been 
made permanently inoperable. 
. . . . 
(c) “Detachable magazine” means any ammunition feeding de-
vice, the function of which is to deliver one or more ammunition 
cartridges into the firing chamber, which can be removed from the 
firearm without the use of any tool, including a bullet or ammuni-
tion cartridge. 
(d) “Large capacity magazine” means any ammunition feeding 
device with  the capacity to accept more than [ten] rounds, but 
shall not be construed to include any of the following: 
(1) A feeding device that has been permanently altered so that it  
 cannot accommodate more than [ten] rounds. 
(2) A [twenty-two] caliber tube ammunition feeding device. 
(3) A tubular magazine that is contained in a lever-action firearm. 
(e) “Muzzle brake” means a device attached to the muzzle of a 
weapon that utilizes escaping gas to reduce recoil. 
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(f) “Muzzle compensator” means a device attached to the muzzle 
of a weapon that utilizes escaping gas to control muzzle move-
ment. 
3. Prohibitions 
(a) No person, corporation or other entity in the [United States] 
may manufacture, import, possess, purchase, sell, or transfer any 
assault weapon or large capacity magazine. 
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to: 
(1) Any government officer, agent, or employee, member of the 
armed  forces of the United States, or peace officer, to the extent 
that such  person is otherwise authorized to acquire or possess an 
assault weapon and/or large capacity magazine, and does so while 
acting  within the scope of his or her duties; or 
(2) The manufacture, sale, or transfer of an assault weapon or 
large capacity ammunition feeding device by a firearms manufac-
turer or dealer that is properly licensed under federal, state, and lo-
cal laws to any branch of the armed forces of the United States, or 
to a law enforcement agency in [the United States] for use by that 
agency or its employees for law enforcement purposes. 
. . . . 
(c) Any person who, prior to the effective date of this law, was 
legally in possession of an assault weapon or large capacity maga-
zine shall have [ninety] days from such effective date to do any of 
the following without being subject to prosecution: 
(1) Remove the assault weapon or large capacity magazine from 
the [United States]; 
(2) Render the assault weapon permanently inoperable; or 
(3) Surrender the assault weapon or large capacity magazine to 
the appropriate law enforcement agency for destruction.212
 212. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 210, at 59–61.  Appendix G is part of a 
report, Banning Assault Weapons–A Legal Primer for State and Local Action, which is a 
publication of the Legal Community Against Violence (now known as the Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence).  Id. at 57; About Us, L. CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
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V. CONCLUSION
Although Heller I is widely viewed as a pro-guns-rights case, assault 
weapons bans remain constitutional under the Second Amendment.213  The 
Second Amendment is subject to limitations and regulations similar to other 
fundamental rights, and nothing in Heller I suggests anything to the con-
trary.214 Heller I’s narrow holding does not confer a right to keep and bear 
assault weapons, and consequently assault weapons bans are constitutionally 
permissible.215  Congress should promptly enact legislation criminalizing the 
manufacture, sale, and possession of assault weapons consistent with prevail-
ing public opinion, such as the law suggested by the Law Center to Prevent 
Gun Violence.  This measure can only aid in subsequent prevention of catas-
trophic violence, like that which occurred in Aurora, Colorado, Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin, and Portland, Oregon.
http://smartgunlaws.org/about-gun-laws (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).  The model law is modi-
fied for adoption by the United States Congress.  See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra
note 210, at v, 15.  Intentionally absent is a “penalty” or “punishment” section, as this article 
merely opines that assault weapons manufacture, sale, and possession should be subject to 
criminal liability and chooses to abstain from addressing the broader policy question of crimi-
nal punishment. 
 213. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2000); Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263–64; see also
supra Part IV.A–B. 
 214. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 215. See id. at 627, 635; Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
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